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I Marketization: the hidden shock therapy 
I. 1 Performance 
The transition to market in Hungary resulted in a deep crisis between 1990 and 1994. 
Table 1 reveals that GDP, real incomes are still creeping in the negative range, in-
dustrial output was 40 percent less in 1993 than in 1988, agricultural output dropped 
to less than the half of its earlier level. Temporary positive developments, like the 
positive balance of payments are now turning into negative, and seem to follow the 
downward spiral. Unemployment is still high (13%) with similar trend in crime-
rates. 
     Looking at the indicators, the question arises: what are that reasons for such 
a crisis? The question is the more interesting, since Hungary after a long period of 
step-by-step reform preparation peacefully transformed in 1990. 
     The fact of a severe crisis cannot be denied. It is no exaggeration to say that 
the present crisis is greater than the great depression was (1929-1933). At that time 
national product dropped by 7 percent, but now by 19 percent, industrial output 
decreased by 12 percent, while now by 36 percent. Also, there is a general understan-
ding that the newly liberalized market and the monetary mechanism do not work 
[6] 
     Expectations before the systemic change were not optimistic either but real 
developments with their graveness and prolongation surpassed even those who tried 
to assess the effects of the transformation. Western economists did not foresee such 
a crisis. They only advised in a simple way that the predominance of private owner-
ship and a restriction of the redistributory role of the state budget are necessary con-
ditions for a market economy, but did not provide answers as to what to do in a not-
underdeveloped postcommunist society where private ownership is rather limited 
and all public services are financed by the state budget. Also politicians were not 
aware of such a danger and a look at the new parties' programs for the 1990 elec-
tions will suffice to conclude that conceptions on the practical transition were 
drafted rather roughly and did not sense an aggravating crisis [2]. There were several 
economists who warned of the disastrous consequences of suddenly opening up the 
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Table 1 Main indicators
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
GDP (% -3 .3 -11 .9 -4 .3 -2 .3 2.0
Consumer prices (%) 28.9 35.0 23.0 23.0 18.0
Real income per capita (%) -1 .6 -11 .6 -2 .8 -5 .0 2.1
Unemployment (thousand) 79 406 663 632 520
Exports ($million) 6,346 9,258 10,028 8,094 10,701
Imports ($million) 5,998 9,069 10,076 11,340 14,554
Trade balance ($bn) 0.348 0.189 -0 .048 -3 .3 -3 .8
Current account balance 0.127 0.267 0.324 -3 .5 -3 .9
Gross foreign debt, in convertible curr. ($bn) 21.3 22.7 21.4 -24 .6 28.5
Source: Statistical Yearbook
economy and connecting it with massive privatization. True enough, these opinions 
could not be published at that time, which again is quite understandable remember-
ing the unidirectional "away from socialism and state" revolutionary swing. 
     The prevailing conception of the transition maintained, basically, that the 
state, as it is, together with its bureaucratic institutions and its initiative-killing 
ownership must be liquidated, and domestic market must be opened for foreign com-
petition. Private ownership and live competition will then press companies to 
restructure and catch up with advanced western nations. Even the somewhat sober 
monetary approach did not foresee that marketization could go so much wrong. All 
it was concerned about was the problem of hidden inflation and the monetary 
overhang, namely, that as prices were freed high inflation would develop. Inflation 
was to be left until it hits the limit of demand. Then, at that point inflation would 
stop, the monetary overhang disappear, price ratios stabilize and an expansive 
monetary policy could begin to boost growth'. All in all, the leading opinions main-
tained that through abolishing the remnants of the state, a free market would 
automatically result in 2-3 years in tangible growth and rising living standards2. 
Transitional hardships of unemployment and dwindling real incomes were deemed 
to be compensated through maintaining a social network. 
1 It is in this line, for example, that the heavy corporate income tax in 1990 was promised to be eased after 
  2 years. Yet, in 1992 the opposite happened: taxes were increased. 
2 (This approach) "extremely strongly believes in the power of the market and private ownership. According-
  ly, it is only a question of time, and the immanent forces of the economy by themselves will lead to an upsw-
  ing from the bottom ... I must confess that for a long time I myself too, was inclined to accept this stance." -
  Kornai admits in retrospect [11] p. 597. 
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I. 2 The main lesson: hidden shock therapy 
For gradual transition usually the Hungarian practice is referred, where elements of 
the market were gradually created beginning from 1968 so that when in 1990 the mo-
ment for systemic change arrived, the soil for the transition has already been 
prepared and transition progressed smoothly. In fact, however, transition proved to 
be not smooth. How can then the Hungarian case be assessed? Is it a case for 
gradual transition or not? 
     It is quite true that several elements of the market were created before the 
systemic change. Thus, for instance the central planning with its mandatory direc-
tives was abolished, prices were to a great part freed, the exchange rate was introduc-
ed helping to harmonize domestic prices with world market ones, and especially 
from the early 1980s the overcentralized industrial organization structure was split 
off into smaller units, the embryonic forms of private enterpreneurship like private 
taxis, restaurants, small industry (first up to 20, then to 40 employees) were lincens-
ed. The reform of 1968 was even coined at that time as "radical type" because from 
the beginning several fields of the management system were simultaneously reform-
ed and because one of the key elements of the old system, the central planning in-
dicators were abolished. In contrast, other Eastern European countries reformed a 
selected part of their economic mechanisms and modified only the central planning. 
     However, the year of 1968 is also known for suppressing the Prague Spring. 
This circumstance had a serious effect on how to carry out the reform in Hungary. 
The effect was that the reform became rather pragmatic avoiding basic issues of 
which two were especially decisive: the state ownership and the close relation with 
the Soviet economy (and politics). As a result of the pragmatic compromise, the 
reform was tolerated by the Soviet Union and, on the other hand, remained con-
troversial. 
     Probably one of the most striking examples of this controversion is how the 
ownership issue was circumvented by tricky reforms. After the mammoth industrial 
organizations were split into smaller units, around the mid 1980s the problem of 
their running arose. Since their state ownership was a taboo, the main approach 
argued that, following the example of developed western economies, ownership and 
management should be separated, leaving the ownership issue aside, and focussing 
on more effective forms of how to manage state assets. One new form was the enter-
prise self-management, that is, directors instead of being nominated by ministries, 
were elected by workers. Workers also elected an enterprise council. The result was 
that due to the lack of a real owner and the ensuing lack of capital efficiency, com-
panies sold their assets, using the incomes for wage-pays. Also at the same time, 
workers were allowed after normal working hours to form associations in order to 
undertake work from their own or mainly from other companies, whereby they 
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could freely use the assets of their own company. As the income from association 
work was exempt from the strict wage regulation binding enterprises, the overwork 
efficiency increased but the official work's deteriorated and the wage outflow gave a 
push to inflation. 
     In a reappraisal then, it can be concluded, even the Hungarian reform was 
not "radical" because it left the basic issues of state ownership and Soviet relations 
unresolved (priority of the linkage to the Soviet economy). Therefore, the capital 
efficiency, the deterioration of which together with the exhaustion of the resources 
(free labor and cheap industrial resources) of the former extensive growth type were 
the causes leading to the 1968 reform, did not undergo any substantial changes. This 
is apparent in the GDP development curve. The growth rate after 1968 only tem-
porarily improved in the early 1970s giving way to a continuous downward trend 
which in 1988 and 1989 entered already the negative range. 
     Under such conditions, in 1990 the systemic change started. The changes 
were dramatic: 
- Privatization began , resulting in massive unemployment. In a single year, during 
1991, the number of unemployed jumped from 80 thousand to 406 thousand, from a 
1.9 percent rate to 7.5 percent. Such an explosion in unemployment could have been 
prevented by simply asking companies to distribute cuts for a few years, as it is prac-
ticed for example in Japan3 or other western countries which consider also social 
effects of restructuring. 
     Other companies being not involved in the first packages of privatization, 
were also discouraged because of unclear expectations causing further decline in per-
formance. 
- Import was dramatically liberalized: in 2 years 90% of imports were freed . This ex-
posed domestic producers to hard foreign competition and, since it was impossible 
for them to restructure in such a short period, they inevitably lost markets. What is 
important, however, is that loss of market outlets and idleness of capacities was in 
many causes not an inevitable crisis-phenomenon necessarily accompanying the tran-
sition, but the result of an uncoordinated import liberalization, and it was the more 
so because a restructuring-oriented industrial policy was lacking4. When domestic 
made toothpaste and garden-tools suddenly disappear, squeezed out by foreign 
made ones, the relevance of ill-considered liberalization is hardly deniable. 
- Prices were freed , budgetary subsidies were drastically slashed. Companies tried 
3 As a result of the strong yen, affected companies decided 15-30 percent cuts in 1993, however it will be 
  realized evenly distributed within 3 years. 
4 "This crisis is an ensuing phenomenon of the transition from planned economy to market economy, which 
  includes a considerable loss of markets and in which, just because of losing markets, the great part of pro-
  duction capacities proves to be of no use" - Erdos writes [4] p. 730, and feels it satisfactory to stop at such a 
  general explanation. 
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to make up for the outfall in their revenues by raising their prices, which fuelled infla-
tion. 
- COMECON collapsed, and due to problems resulting from the new dollar-pay-
ment system, the market of the former Soviet Union closed. Hungary's export to 
COMECON markets diminished by 55% between 1989 and 1993. Surprisingly, com-
panies could during the one year switch to OECD, especially EC markets, pushing 
out their stocks and thereby refuting the generally accepted belief that eastern 
market oriented capacities cannot be converted to western exports. The actual shock 
appeared 2 years later, when it became clear that companies cannot adjust to new 
changes on western markets, and so from 1993 western exports began to shrink con-
siderably. This can also be ascribed to the lacking industrial policy. In addition, 
from 1992 to September 1993 a severe bankruptcy law was applied, liquidating com-
panies which had been responsible for 31 yo of total exports. 
- From 1992-1993 a new shock-element was added, the privatization of the land, 
which caused the collapse of the relatively successful agriculture production system 
relying on the cooperation between large state-cooperative farms and smaller 
household plots. Agriculture, which through the past 30 years was a successful pillar 
of the economy and contributing an important share to western exports, suddenly 
collapsed, production and living stock dangerously decreased, import of basic food 
items became necessary. Although sober economists warned of such an outcome, 
the privatization of land was given a political priority5. But, even so, a well prepared 
agricultural policy combining financial help and promoting the access to necessary 
machinery for new farmers could have considerably smoothed the transition. It is 
not appropriate to argue in this case with the standard statement that such deficien-
cies are due to deficiences in the coordination mechanism of the market6, but it 
seems quite evident that the transition itself was not "coordinated", that is, it was 
unduly prepared. 
     From the points mentioned above, the conclusion emerges, that 
- contrary to common belief, the transition in Hungary was not gradual because 
earlier reforms failed to resolve the basic problems. Therefore it was in fact a hidden 
shock therapy. Leading economists not only took a liberal market approach and urg-
ed the government to follow their advice but the government also deviated from its 
original, more balanced transition concept. 
5 The Smallholders Party when consenting to participate in the coalition government, stipulated as a precon-
  dition the reprivatization of the land, that is to return the land to its original owners according to the status 
  of 1947, or to their descendants. 
6 Kornai in his analysis imply registers that the new, market coordination is not working in some fields like 
   agriculture and construction industry, and that economic actors in the new market-system can hardlysee 
   an orientation. [8] p. 581. 
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- the systemic changes are not a mysterious task but can be deciphered in concrete 
terms like opening the domestic market, importing foreign capital, handling of infla-
tion and unemployment. To master these tasks, however, a concerted transition 
scenario would have been necessary, including an established industrial-foreign 
trade-agricultural policy. Since such a policy-making implicitly means a governmen-
tal guidance, which was falsely identified with the former detailed state regulation 
(central planning), it was generally rejected in the wave of "liberalization". 
- from the above it also follows , that what we have to do with, is not a "transforma-
tional crisis", a crisis necessarily appearing with the transition from socialism to 
capitalism, but it is the disastrous consequences of a one-sided, naively liberal 
marketization approach'. 
I.3 Reasons 
a) The real economy 
The market is already in existence, yet it is not working. The shortage economy ceas-
ed to exist, because companies do not complain any more of difficulties in obtaining 
resources for their production. Thus, the earlier sellers' market transformed into a 
buyers' market. Import was liberalized and a real competition began. 
     However, the market is not working positively. Companies face now a low de-
mand. The pattern of real economy is not improving because supply adjustment is 
slow. The former coordination mechanism was abolished, but the new, market-type 
one is just emerging, therefore companies have no orientation. Here privatization is 
not helpful for the short run either, it can result in higher efficiency only in the long 
run. Banking is underdeveloped, the relatively high liquidity is pinned down and not 
flowing to companies. Companies are not confident about future, investments 
dramatically fell (-29% over 3 years). 
b) The monetary mechanism 
The Hungarian crisis is unique and incomparable with western ones because its main 
elements like balance of payments, real rate of interest on loans and budgetary 
deficit exhibit a different development. 
     Throughout 1990-1994 the monetary policy was restrictive. this has its origin 
in the deepening deficit of the state budget. The budgetary deficit through the 
crowding out effect causes only a diminished part of saving to be used for in-
vestments, the other part being sucked up by deficit-covering bonds. To cover the 
7 Tardos maintains that the crisis is in a 3/4 part due to the problems inherited from the previous regime and 
  in 1/4 part to the failures of the government [15]. Such an approach is at least as much apologetic as 
  argumenting with the omnipotence of free market and to ascribe the crisis to the rigidity of the real 
  economy in complying with new market conditions. 
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deficit, the government through its central bank draws in money from commercial 
banks (by increasing their reserve ratio) and pays them only a low interest. Commer-
cial banks, however, in an effort to make up for this low interest rate, charge their 
client companies a high interest rate. Therefore, interest on loans will be high, which 
deters companies from investment8. In the present crisis situation, when companies 
lost their markets and are burdened by heavy taxes which in turn are triggered by the 
needs of budgetary deficit-covering, the rate of profit of companies is understan-
dably low. The depression in which the economy is trapped is then basically due to 
the extreme discrepancy between the low rate of profits and the high interest on 
loans. 
     In the following we will take up two basic issues of the transition, the 
privatization and the reform of the state budget. 
II Privatization 
II. 1 Main characteristics 
Similarly to the 1968 economic reform, the Hungarian way of privatization was con-
ceived rather pragmatically, which is again a distinctive feature from the privatiza-
tion methods adopted in neighboring countries. 
     The choice of the pragmatic approach was rooted mainly in the shortage of 
potential domestic capital to buy up state firms on the one hand, and in the 
budgetary deficit, on the other; or rather the budgetary deficit-cutting pressure from 
the IMF. The relationship between the budgetary deficit and privatization may at 
first seem not self-evident. In concrete terms is meant the intention to use the earn-
ings from selling state companies in a fifty-fifty proportion for covering budgetary 
deficit and upgrading loss-making state companies for later selling, respectively. 
Also, privatization policy makers were aware of the necessity of upgrading state 
companies before putting them for sale. Therefore, the capital-raising aim became 
the most important point in the privatization conception. As a result, ideas about 
the voucher-type or cross-ownership9 type privatization were discarded, since there 
8 This is a crucial difference with Kornai, who contends that in Hungary real interest rate on loans is at pre-
  sent not high for companies, but it is the uncertain expectations which retain companies from investing ([8] 
  p. 584). 
9 Cross ownership means that companies mutually own the decisive stake among themselves. This form is 
  especially developed in Japan where banks, trading houses and insurance companies are also participants. 
  A Japanese professor, M. Iwata suggested for postsocialist countries to carry out privatization through 
  cross ownership. His main concern was the capital shortage and the aim to prevent inflationary money emis-
  sion. Therefore, according to him, the bank would give a targeted money in form of credit to enterprises 
  which could use this money only for buying shares from each other. Enterprises when sellingtheir shares 
  could use their earning also for buying the shares of other enterprises. Finally, at the end of the process the 
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would no new capital be raised, moreover there would no new influential owners be 
created, the ownership would remain shared by many hands, hence no change in the 
management could be expected. In Czechoslovakia or Russia where the voucher 
type of privatization was accepted, the lengthy process of exchanging vouchers for 
shares and, in turn, selling the shares to real owners, or the concentration of shares 
in the hands of a few owners only retards the privatization without resulting in any 
new capital. 
     The pragmatic approach in Hungary also solved the dilemma of privatization 
versus reprivatization. Namely, it was decided not to give back state firms to their 
earlier owners, but to new ones. The only exception was land where former owners 
or their descendants according to the ownership status of the year 1947 could get 
back their property. Due to the way of realization10, however, not the original size 
of land was returned to them. 
     The task of privatization was immense. Altogether 2,200 state enterprizes 
were to be privatized, of which 350 were employing between 5 and 10 thousand peo-
ple. All fields of the economy were open for privatization except for energy, medical 
care and partly the transportation and telecommunication. The new government's 
program envisaged a 3 years period for giving the above mentioned 2,200 companies 
into private hands which would mean the privatization of 30-35 percent of total 
state assets [21]. Actually, this 30-35 percent of assets to be privatized means, that it 
was not the aim to privatize a dominant part of the economy, though the companies 
targeted for privatization were the key ones, but rather to introduce a new, mixed 
ownership system in which, together with private companies, also companies owned 
by public sector, local governments, pension funds etc. would exist. 
     The 2,200 state enterprizes had assets at a nominal book value of HUF 2,000 
billion. The potential stock of private savings was estimated at the same time only at 
one-tenth of the assets value, so it was apparent that privatization should be based 
on inviting foreign investors. 
     In order to provide a certain supervision and to operatively handle privatiza-
tion, the State Property Agency was set up in 1990, which together with well-known 
western auditing companies like Price Waterhouse, Barclays de Zoete Wedd Ltd and 
Baker and Mc Kenzie selected companies for sale and prepared valuations of the 
companies to be sold. 
   money will be withdrawn (Business Review, Hitotsubashi University, Vol. 30 No 1, Aug. 1990; in 
   Japanese) 
10 Land was not returned in its natural size but through a value adjustment. First, original owners received a
   so-called compensation certificate with a face value which could be exchanged for land. This exchange was 
   organized in the form of a licit procedure during which the land's price increased. Consequently, thecer-
   tificate's unchanged face value could buy up a land smaller in size than the original one. Thus, proprietors 
   could recover in terms of size only about 1/10-1/15 of their original and. 
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11. 2 Results 
The results after 3 years are shown in Table 2. Of the 2,200 companies intended for 
privatization about one-third in number as well as in book value have in fact been 
transformed. Although the figures may vary according to sources", it can be con-
cluded that the target could not be fulfilled, the pace was too slow. What is in accor-
dance with the expectations, is the dominant role of foreign capital, which ac-
counted for 60-80% of the proceeds in the years 1990-1993. 
     Thanks to the free atmosphere of enterpreneurship, many new companies 
opened (Table 5). Almost 80 percent of them, however, were employing less than 20 
people (Table 6). The private sector contributed already 39 percent to the GDP, with 
cooperatives it comes to 45 percent (Table 7). Small private organizations are rather 
active in exports, alone in 1992 their deliveries rose by 126 percent. 
     The large number of new establishments is, however, fallacious. Many small 
companies are hibernating because due to initial market failures they are waiting for 
a new opportunity, or are existing only on paper. This is supported by the evidence, 
that their registered capital remained at HUF 1 million or so which is just the 
minimum limit required for setting up a shareholding company. In practice, the 
number of companies being active on the market is estimated at 2000-2500 which is 
almost identical with that before privatization. In this sense, privatization did not 
(or not yet) contribute to creating a competitive market. 
II. 3 Privatization methods 
The law on transformation was enacted in 1989 allowing state enterprizes to 
transform themselves into shareholding and limited companies. Transformation 
              Table 2 Transformation of state owned companies* 
                                 Dec. 31 Dec. 31 Dec. 31 Apr. 30 
                          1990 1991 1992 1993
 Number of companies 27 218 602 760 
 Book value (bn Forint) 26.19 345.07 645 650.85 
 Value acknowledged for trans-
    formation (bn Forint) 42 465 1,364 1,439 
                       *Companies belonging to the State Property Agency (SPA) 
                        Source: [8], for 1993: [15] Vol. I. p. 100 
11 According to another source (Nepszabadsag 20 May 1993) only 18.69 percent of the Ft 2000 billion state 
   assets could be privatized. It must be admitted that data in different sources vary, e.g. the NationalBank 
   estimates the total revenues from privatization for 1992 at HUF 67.6 billion (table 5) while the report of 
   the SPA puts it at HUF 72 billion ([5] p. 23). 
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           Table 3 Privatization revenues of the SPA* (HUF billion) 
                            1990 1991 1992 1993 
                         HUF °o HUF o HUF % HUF %
  Property yield - - 0.9 4.7 2.4 
 Sale for foreign exchange 0.53 79 24.6 81 41.0 65 25.5 59 
 Sale for forints 0.14 21 4.8 16 17.5 28 15.3 35 
  Cash revenues, total 0.67 30.3 63.2 43.2 
  Sale for loans - 1.0 9.1 21.7 
  Sale for compensation vouchers - - 2.3 13.0 
  Privatization revenues, total 0.67 31.4 74.4 77.9 
        *State Property Agency, a governmental organization carrying out privatization 
        Source: Privinfo 1995 
                     Table 4 Results of privatization 
                          Planned Actual, 1993 Performance () 
                     (A) (B) (B/A) 
  Number of companies 2200 760* 34 
  Book value (bill. Forint) 2000 650.85 32 
                                   *30 April 1993 
                                        Source: compiled from table 2 and 3 
                   Table 5 Number of economic entitites 
                         1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993, 31 July 
 Incorporated economic associations 919 5,191 19,401 42,697 59,363 69,104 
                                                   Source: [15] Vol. I. p. 89 
was stimulated by tax allowances. As a result, many enterprizes transformed into 
smaller units taking with themselves the assets and leaving behind a merely formal 
company office. This period of "hollowing out" continued until March 1990, and is 
called a "spontaneous privatization" because no state authority controlled the real 
value of assets and the process itself. Using this opportunity many state enterprise 
managers, the "nomenklatura" personalized state assets under often formal 
shareholding company establishment deals with foreigners, thus securing for 
themselves a new footing in the market economy. To provide a controlled flow of 
privatization, the State Property Agency (SPA) was set up in March 1990. 
     The SPA then, launched centrally initiated programs: the first privatization 
program involved 20 companies with a total assets value of HUF 70 billion in 1990, 
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followed by the second privatization program including 22 companies. In addition, 
there was a pre-privatization program aiming at retail outlets (domestic trade, 
restaurants, services, gasoline stations). In this latter case accumulation of citizens 
helped by credits bought up the assets. 
     The enterprise-initiated self-privatization targeted medium size enterprises 
which could find new owners through privatization consulting firms (not the SPA). 
In two steps 420+210 enterprizes were involved. The decisive majority of investors 
were Hungarian citizens, many of them using the opportunity of employee buy-outs. 
     Employee partial ownership program enabled employees to acquire the 
shares of their enterprise. They were helped by preferential loan, instalment 
payments and profit tax allowance. By July 1993 24 sales were realized. 
    Privatization by leasing aimed at bridging the problem of capital shortage. 
Here also, tax preferences were granted. 
     Compensation vouchers acquired by citizens as a compensation for their na-
tionalized property or land, can be exchanged for shares in state companies. The 
market value of compensation 
vouchers is only 50-60% of their Table 6 Concentration of labor force 
face value, because the supply of No of employees Share of companies 
state assets offered for exchange is in total (% 
limited by the SPA12. 300- 2 .9 
     The small investor share- 51-300 8.5
holder program aims at involving 21-50 10.5 
masses of citizens. According to -20 78.3 
the program, shares may be pur- Source: Central Statistical Office, 1993 
chased by individual citizens up to 
                  Table 7 Composition of GDP by sectors (percent) 
                                          1991 1992
   Economic associations in private ownership 15 18
   Small entrepreneurs 18 21 
       Private sector (without cooperatives) 33 39 
   Cooperatives 8 6 
       Total private sector 41 45
   Economic entities of central and local governments 59 55 
      GDP total 100 100
                                                   Source: [15] Vol. I. p. 92 
12 A. Kurcz: Keszpenz helyett (Instead of cash) Figyelo 30 Sept. 1993 
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a maximum of HUF 100,000 to be repaid within 5 years without interest. This pro-
gram started in early 1994. 
     Privatization is being helped by special credit facilities to back domestic in-
vestors. One is the credit line of the National Bank of Hungary, the second is the so-
called existence loan (E-loan) channelled towards small investors through the com-
mercial banks (and refinanced by the National Bank of Hungary). To help borrow-
ing for small investors through extending guarantees the Small Enterpreneurs' 
Guarantee Fund and the Credit Guarantee Corporation were set up. 
     In 1992, as a new institution, the Hungarian State Holding Company was 
established. Its role is to manage the state assets to be retained in state ownership for 
a longer run. 
     A special field is agriculture where the reprivatization was allowed. 
Cooperative members or non-member owners could get back their land. As for the 
members, the majority of them (80-85%) opted for a new cooperative form. 
However, the transformation, including re-forming cooperatives and privatization 
of land tore up effective cooperation between the large scale production of 
cooperatives and private farms. This resulted in an abrupt decline of agricultural out-
put throughout in 1991 and 1992. 
II. 4 Evaluation of results 
     The main advantage is probably, that the pragmatic line has been followed 
throughout 1990-1994. First it means, that state property was sold against effective 
money and created new owners. Second, it was good that compensation claims to be 
satisfied by distributing state property, were restricted13. In this context even the 
manipulations of exchanging compensation vouchers for land or shares leading to 
considerable loss in original property for the former owners, could be assessed 
positively. 
     In the final result, however, the meaning of new capital becomes dubious, 
since revenues from selling the state assets were sucked up by the increasing deficit of 
state budget. Originally, half of the revenues was supposed to be reinvested in loss 
making companies to upgrade and to restructure them. There is, however, no 
evidence, that such a recycling of revenues took place14 
13 The suggestion to grant compensation for political damages was for example declined. 
14 As Mr. Imre V. Csuhaj, cabinet chief of the privatization minister explained in an interview, the SPA 
   from the revenues must transfer a considerable part to the state budget for deficit covering, further it must 
   pay dividends after the enterprizes under the SPA (payable to the state budget), contributions to central 
   funds like employment fund, regional development fund, agricultural fund, helping small banksand in-
   surance companies, and contributions to write off debts of enterprizes to be privatized. In the final 
   balance, expenditures exceed revenues for 1993. (Tobb a kinadas, mint a bevetel; Expenditures exceed 
   revenues, Nepszabadsag 28 Jan. 1993) 
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     The main deficiency of the privatization was its slowness, according to 
widespread criticism. The general explanation for it argues, that the 3 years privatiza-
tion plan was too ambitious and that in fact a longer period is necessary when an 
emerging new wealthy class will be able to buy up state assets. More concrete season-
ings blame the SPA for the slowness (for example [14]), saying that its small staff 
was unable to handle the process, or, that the SPA consciously delayed it. In addi-
tion, however, it must be mentioned, that negotiations about a given enterprize 
usually stumbled on two difficult problems. First, the real value of the assets: foreign 
investors were in a stronger position because of the oversupply of assets, thus the 
idea to invite them for an open tender, proved unworkable, while on the other hand 
the SPA did not want to agree on a bargain sale. Second, in several cases negotia-
tions were delayed on the side of the enterprize, where employees were privatization-
averse fearing a severe restructuring and dismissal. Considering the ensuing massive 
unemployment, however, the slowness is hardly to be blamed, otherwise it would 
have caused more severe problems. 
     During the early 1990s the world economy entered a depression together with 
a contracting capital supply. Western Germany, one of the most powerful potential 
investors, became involved in the reconstruction of Eastern Germany as a result of 
unification, while starting privatizations in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Russia 
distracted capital flows from Hungary. 
     Remarkable is also, that foreign capital entering Hungary, in competitive in-
dustries preferred establishing new facilities to buying up existing assets, which is a 
further factor in the slow privatization [8]. A striking example is the Magyar Suzuki 
which trained unskilled labor and erected a new plant instead of using existing 
capacities in the automobile industry [3]. These facilities mean a real market restruc-
turing and help creating a competitive market. Those foreign investors who bought 
up existing assets, usually conserved the market structure. They were mostly content 
with buying a company and acquiring its market share in the Hungarian economy, 
so they just kept running production or instead, sold their own products through the 
sales network of the purchased company. Since the Hungarian market is shared by 
usually 2-5 companies, the foreign investor at once acquired 20-30 percent of the 
market, securing for himself an oligopolistic position whereby the need to moder-
nize equipments or increase the market share was not compelling. Due to this cir-
cumstance, the participation of foreign capital was not always promoting a com-
petitive market. 
     An interesting phenomenon is the considerable growth of private savings 
since the systemic change (1990). There are various reasons for this like an increased 
saving propensity due to the emergence of a new wealthy class or to higher risk of 
everyday living for lower income masses. Concerning the real increase in savings, 
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there are several estimations, one even denying any increase but attributing it to the 
ballooning effect of inflation15. For our purpose, sure is, however, that citizens were 
not willing to spend their savings for buying up shares. And if buying securities, 
they bought rather state bonds, guaranteeing a safe interest. But, due to the fact that 
these bonds were covering the deficit of the government's budget, these private spen-
dings are just a part of the crowding-out effect, that is, they do not become in-
vestments to boost restructuring or production. Nor have they any connection with 
helping privatization. 
     In 1995 privatization entered a new phase, the energy sector. For the state it is 
convenient to modernize through privatization, but since energy is a monopolistic 
sector, the ensuing unemployment will be left to the state, whereas profits will flow 
out from the country and higher monopolistic prices will give a push to inflation. 
Therefore, according to some opinions, only 25% of the sector should be privatized 
[13]. 
     Was it, at all, necessary to sell the well-functioning successful companies? In 
developed western economies privatization is usually preferred if the performance 
of a company is deteriorating and through privatization an upgrading is expected 
from private initiative. Actually, the conception on privatization visioned a 
pluralistic system with different forms of ownership allowing for state ownership, 
too. Probably, it could have been a better solution to put on sale at the beginning 
just a few good companies to attract interest and to retain other successful ones. 
Because, even in the case of selling successful companies, the new (foreign) owner 
laid off employees increasing thereby unemployment. Concerning the privatization 
of loss-making enterprizes with surplus labor, the cuts of labor force could have 
been distributed for a period of a few years. 
     It was hoped that market liberalization and privatization would automatical-
ly produce an effective management and lead to restructuring. It was also a serious 
failure of the privatization that, contrary to initial principles, the revenue from sell-
ing state assets, was not recycled in order to upgrade bad enterprizes. It happened 
so, however, not by accident. Namely, to upgrade bad companies some strategic vi-
sion is necessary, be it called industrial policy16. But, from the 1990 systemic change 
industrial policy was considered as a foe to marketization resembling the perpetua-
tion of earlier governmental intervention therefore it was impossible to work out 
least to apply any industrial policy. Hence, at the present stage investments must be con-
15 A. Simon calculates that in 1992 savings in real terms were on the same level as in 1989 [12]. 
16 The usual argumentation runs that it was the increasing budgetary deficit which swallowed revenues from 
   privatization. However, would have been there a development strategy, it would have had a priority in 
   spendings. 
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nected with a development strategy including industrial policy17.
III State budget: double-hard constraint 
Several tasks were set at reforming the state budget: 
 - since the overwhelming part of revenue was redistributed through the budget , 
   this redistributory role was to be greatly curtailed 
 - tax revenue was to be increased , and budgetary subsidies for consumer prices 
   and companies making losses were to be restricted 
 - items of social welfare (health , pensions, education) were to be separated and
Table 8 Pattern of budget revenue and expenditure 1990-1995 (%)
Revenue 
Payments by economic organizations 
Taxes on consumption 
Payments by citizens 
Payments from budgetary organizations 
Revenue from international transactions 
Tax from financial institutions 
Revenue from debt servicing 
Revenue from privatization 
Expenditure 
Subsidies to economic organizations 
Consumer price subsidies 
Investment expenditure 
Transfers for social security 
Social security services 
Transfers to central budgetary institutions 
Transfers to local governments 




















































Source: Ministry of Finance
17 M. Tardos in his lecture on Hungarian transition [15] went one step further than in his article ([14], here 
   writing only about holdings and other new forms of privatization) by mentioning explicitly the necessity 
   of "industrial policy", leaving its content however unspecified.
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 Table 9 Payments by economic organizations 
           (billion Forint)
Table 10 Expenditures of the budget 
in percent of GDP
   1990 
plan actual
  1991 1992 
plan actual plan actual
1990 1991 1992 1993
273.7 257.753 231.6 200.4 215.8 193.85
62.5 69.9 74.9 73.6
Source: [9] p. 608
Source: [9] p. 603
   run as distinct funds with market footing 
 - expenditure on government administration was to be cut 
     Between 1990-1995 the pattern of both revenue and expenditure has 
undergone several changes (table 8). In accordance with intentions, tax revenue in-
creased. This increase, however, is true only for taxes paid by citizens and con-
sumers, but not for companies. Revenue from companies drastically fell not only in 
their share within total revenues, but which is worse, in absolute volume (table 11). 
Revenue from companies in 1992 was only 47% of what it was in 1990. This is a 
signal that companies are in severe transformation difficulties. It must be added, 
that the efficiency indicators in privatized companies are 25 percent higher than in 
state companies [8], but private companies are paying only 65-70% of what is paid 
by state ones ([6] p. 731). This contradiction is due to increased tax evasion, low tax-
paying morals and lacking effective methods of corporate income control". 
     On the expenditure side, subsidies to companies and consumer prices radical-
ly decreased as also did centrally financed investments. These developments are in ac-
cordance with the intentions because they repressed the redistributory function of 
the budget. However, social expenditures remained with the same share and newly 
established governmental institutions were also added. Thus, in the final result the 
ratio of budget expenditure to GDP not only did not decrease but actually increased 
from 62.5 percent in 1990 to over 70 percent in 1993 (table 4). Even if some distor-
tions due to cumulative account are eliminated, the redistribution for 1993 remains 
at 64.5 percent which is ahead of the Scandinavian welfare countries (50-600), not 
to mention the United States (36-38%). 
     By now a new contradiction emerged: the budget became hard for com-
panies, the earlier "soft budget constraint" disappeared, but neither changed its 
redistributive character, nor is it possible to eliminate the large social items like 
health care, education and pensions. To separate the latter items, they should be put 
on new market footing inevitably connected with restructuring personal incomes 
and accompanied by temporary evils of the transition for large masses of citizens. 
18 Not to the badly constructed tax system, as Kornai and Mihalyi assume ([9]). 
                            112
Hungary's Experience: Transition to the Market
This would be politically too 
risky until real incomes do 
not recover. Thus, for a 
while these items will remain 
stiff. Therefore the present 
state of the budget can be 
called as double-hard bud-
get, meaning that.to outside 
the budget constraint became 
hard but its inside pattern is 
also hard.
Table 11 Deficit of the budget







Source: [9] p. 608 and Figyelo 21 Oct. 1993
     A further problem is with the increasing budget dificit (Table 11). The deficit 
is financed by treasury bonds issued by the government and bought up by commer-
cial banks. Therefore the deposits of companies are not recycled as loans for in-
vestments but are used for budget deficit financing. This is the deficit's crowding out 
effect which directly restricts investment. In addition it has an indirect effect causing 
interest rate on loans to companies to rise, because banks prefer lending to the 
government. 
     Earlier, since the deficit was actually financed by money obtained from the 
National Bank of Hungary, also a governmental institution, the debt problem 
could, in fact, have been solved by simply annulling it. Today, however, this way is 
not feasible: 
1. Before 1990 the total governmental debt was due to the National Bank, but as a 
result of market-type financing (issuing bonds), the government now owes debts to 
companies and citizens. 
2. Concerning the government's debt towards the National Bank, this money was 
lent by the National Bank mostly on the basis of credits taken from foreign sources, 
so this part is also repayable. 
     How to reduce the budget deficit? 
     The requirement to reduce budget deficit is strongly pressed by the IMF and 
the Hungarian government is obeying the IMF, because the opinion of this 
prestigeous organization is important for obtaining foreign credits. The ministers of 
finance, especially in 1994 and 1995 devised a plan (mainly the Bokros-program [5]) 
for a drastical cut in spendings for social security services (family allowance) and 
budgetary institutions like state administration and education. These items have a 
high 11 % and 23% share in the 1995 budget (Table 8). Still, the highest item is that 
of the debt service, which increased from a 10% share in 1990 to 27% in 1995. The 
increasing debt service is due to the two digit inflation, which is a phenomenon being 
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only recently proven in detail by economic theory19. Therefore, no cut in spendings 
can be a real solution unless inflation is not supressed. Also, a sound compromise 
with the IMF would be necessary. In 1995 the Hungarian prime minister, Mr. Horn 
already criticized the IMF, saying that the requirement to halve the deficit by 1996 is 
a too hard condition leading to social and political tensions [Magyar Hirlap, 7 July 
1995]. 
IV Outlook for the future (summing up) 
For the future two main steps are considered necessary: (1) to start growth, and (2) 
to give a new role to the state. 
IV. 1 Again growth 
The desire for growth is fueled by the fall of real incomes, the high rate of unemploy-
ment (13-15%), its demoralizing effects and the deteriorating social services. The 
real danger is a political one, the "weimarization" as Kornai puts it ([11] p. 596), 
meaning a socialistic turn again and a halt to marketization. The economic danger is 
the "low-level equilibrium trap" when unemployment remains high, private sector 
will not grow further, budgetary crisis and inflation perpetuate. The downward 
trend may perhaps stop, but economy will remain unable to begin growing. 
     The transition period faces the hard dilemma: what to prefer, stabilization or 
growth? Between 1990-1995 economic policy considered stabilization to be the 
priority task, by 1995 it became clear, that growth is not an automatic result of 
marketization, therefore growth and stabilization must be treated simultaneously. 
Only if the economy begins to grow, can problems of restructuring, budget reform 
and living standards be resolved. 
IV. 2 The new role of state 
At present three main lines of action seem to be necessary: the continuation of key 
elements of transformation (privatization and budget reform), the elaboration of a 
development strategy and an organisational infrastructure. 
     Development strategy. It is important to work out an economic development 
strategy with a supportive monetary policy. The development strategy should focus 
on starting growth and boosting exports. The strategy should select some fields for 
19 See for reference: M. I. Blejer - N. Cheasty: The Measurement ofFiscal Deficit, Journal of Economic 
   Literature 1991, pp. 1644-1678; G. V. Jump: Interest Rates and Inflation, American Economic Review 
   1980, pp. 991-1004; R.Eisner: A new View of the Federal Debt and Budget Deficit, American Economic 
   Review, March 1984; C. T. Taylor: Inflation Adjusted Saving the Sectoral Balances, Bank of England 
   Quarterly Bulletin, 1982. 
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priority development while leaving other fields in the framework of general 
monetary policy. Such priority fields could be: 
- infrastructure, which is relatively less import-intensive but helps business connec-
tions among companies and helps to reduce unemployment; 
- agriculture, which could soon again become a substantial contributor to exports. 
For this, not only recovery of the production base but also the modernisation of 
food processing will be necessary; 
- in manufacturing , industries with market prospects should be selected for develop-
ment. Subcontracting and assembly opportunities from Western countries should be 
temporarily promoted; this would reduce unemployment and help to upgrade work-
ing and technical skills. 
The general approach in development strategy should focus on: 
- import and diffusion of new technologies At present there is no targeted 
monetary policy to help improve technologies. During the transition technical 
development was conceived as a result emanating automatically from market 
liberalisation and privatisation. However, in developed market economies basic 
R&D especially is not usually left to the market because of its high risk. Therefore, 
the government should share this risk with companies. A clear system of monetary 
tools should be devised with tax-free technology imports, considerable corporate tax 
breaks for R&D projects and for applied research. 
- employment policy Present employment policy distinguishes only labour in the 
two extreme situations, the employed and the unemployed. A more flexible ap-
proach is necessary, including in-between stages, and a focus on companies' respon-
sibility. New forms like temporary layoffs, part-time jobs and in-company retraining 
should be encouraged. Today dismissed masses on the labour market are left alone 
to find a new job and consume an increasing portion of the government budget in 
unemployment allowances, while companies are subject to a special tax to con-
tribute to the unemployment allowance fund (in the state budget). Probably this 
money could be used more effectively if spent as a temporary subsidy to wages 
because companies could keep or retrain their labour force until restructuring is car-
ried out and not then need to recruit and train completely new labour. 
- investment and savings The central dilemma for monetary policy at present is 
how to harmonise the real interest rate for credits to companies with that for private 
savings. In any case, interest rate should be pressed down, so that cheap money 
could promote investments. 
- external economic relations The main line will be the integration with EU. At 
the same time, however, trade with neighboring countries should be also developed. 
Since there is an increasing competition on Eastern markets, these markets will not 
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conserve production pattern and will provide an outlet for capacities, which at pre-
sent are not able to face western competition. A payments union for Central Euro-
pean countries would help their cooperation [3a]. Recently a similar idea was propos-
ed by the U.S., to set up a joint fund with the US Eximbank, the EBRD and Western 
European governments for providing export-guarantees to Eastern European 
countries20. 
- organisational infrastructure To devise a development strategy and provide 
guidance for its implementation, a ministry is necessary in which three fundamental 
fields, industry, international trade and technology, are integrated. The importance 
of MITI in Japan's postwar development is well known, as is that of similar 
organisations in South Korea or recently in China. In Hungary a similar ministry 
was set up in 1994, by merging the ministries of industry and international economic 
relations and the national technology agency. This strategic ministry could select the 
new and promising activities to be promoted and help the decline of shrinking bran-
ches. It could reasonably combine trade policy for new industries with helping the in-
flow and application of new technologies. 
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